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Boy Meets Goal, Boy Loses Goal, Boy Gets Goal
The nature of feedback between goal-based
simulation and understanding systems
James R. Meehan
Artificial Intelligence Project
Dept. of Information and Computer Science
University of California
Irvine, California 92717
ABSTRACT. We are designing a goal-based planning and
simulation system called REACTOR for a multiple-actor world
in which partially formulated plans are monitored during
execution, providing feedback to the planner. Plan failures
that occur are diagnosed by a combination of top-down
(plan-synthesis) and bottom-up (plan-understanding)
techniques, allowing an informed choice of response to the
error. By maintaining separate belief spaces for each
actor, we simulate planners who themselves simulate the"
planning and plan-understanding of other actors.
1.0 Introduction
Problem-solving in a world of multiple actors and
uncertain information presents difficulties not apparent
from studying single-actor systems, such as robot planners,
that operate with complete and correct information. We are
designing a program that combines both planning and
plan-understanding, taking into account several aspects:
This research was supported by the Naval Oceans Systems
Center under Grant N66001-80-C-0377.
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1. Separate belief spaces for each actors so that
plans are formed, for example, using only that
actor's information, which can be incorrect and
incomplete (and nearly always is).
Feedback simulation, where the execution of an
actor's plans and the observation of others' plans
are monitored in terms of the actor's goals and
beliefs.
3. Shallow Planning, where an actor can formulate a
plan without worrying about all the details that he
would when executing that plan.
4. Detailed analysis ^ errors during plan execution
(i.e., "What went wrong?"), followed by re-planning
and adaptation.
Hypothetical planning. where an actor simulates
some other actor's problem-solving processes. This
is used as a technique for understanding the
actions of others.
This theory of planning and plan-understanding is part of a
natural-language system we are currently building, called
REACTOR. The principal new feature of this system is its
ability to monitor the execution of its plans and to modify
them when necessary on the basis of their failures. There
are existing language-oriented problem-solving systems that
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produce actions from goals [11]f and text-understanding
systems that infer goals from actions [3^20], but we believe
that a better model of natural-language processing
incorporates both by being completely flexibile with respect
to the "direction" of planning.
Consider the following story:
John wanted to meet Mary, and he received an
invitation to a party given by Jane, John believed
that Jane and Mary were good friends, so he accepted
the invitation. An hour into the party, John had
still not seen Mary.
Viewed as a task for a natural-language understanding
program, the question is what predictions will the program
make for John's future actions. Viewed as a task for a
problem-solving system (with a natural-language generator,
perhaps), the question is what the program should simulate
in terms of John's future actions. We want our theory to be
relatively independent of the "direction" of the program,
understanding or generation, because we believe that in
either case, the most important questions are the same,
namely What went wrong? and What should John do next?
Page 4
2.0 Background
2.1 Plan-understanding systems
Over the last several years, natural language systems
have improved in their ability to deal with story-like
texts, not only because they employ more sophisticated
techniques for mapping words into meaning representations,
but also because they rely on new theories of human
intentionality, Indeed, the "parsers" have less
responsibility than they used to, because they are better
integrated with inference mechanisms and knowledge
structures, and much of the task of understanding lies in
being able to follow the plans and goals of the actors in
the text. The particular systems we will refer to are
Wilensky's PAM [20] and Granger's ARTHUR [3]. These
programs rely heavily on the ability to predict possible
future input, at several levels of abstraction, and to
instantiate or match actual future input with these
predictions, generating still more predictions by means of
an inference mechanism that knows about plans and goals.
These programs build a representation of the causal
structure of the story as understanding proceeds.
The prediction/instantiation process is not infallible;
it can happen that a new sentence corresponds to no
prediction, or it may even contradict the causal structure.
These are not errors of programming or theory. Rather, they
indicate legitimate disagreements between what is reasonable
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to predict and what actually occurs. In the case of a
strongly predicted or highly contradictory event, a reader
might experience surprise or even express disbelief,
indicating that a major revision of the explanation
structure will be required. But many types of "errors"
correspond to accidents that occur in the story, and human
readers can often detect accidents, incorporate the
structural revisions, and hardly notice that anything
unusual happened.
ARTHUR corrects erroneous inferences by supplanting
links in the causal structure with ones that provide an
alternative explanation, even if that forces an
interpretation that may seem unlikely. It takes the view
that flexibility is more important than initial accuracy;
if you don't get it right the first time, that's okay: you
can correct it later on.
2,2 Plan-based simulators
While there are many examples of problem-solving
systems, they tend to deal with single-actor micro-worlds.
(For a survey of such systems, see Sacerdoti [13].) There
are also programs that model the goals of discourse [6,7,8],
but all of these are in general very different from the
style of program we have in mind. The model on which we're
basing the current work is TALE-SPIN [11], a story-generator
and problem-solver for a micro-world of multiple actors.
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based on the theory that stories are frequently goal-driven
[2] .
TALE-SPIN's planning, strategies were adapted from
Schank and Abelson [14], as were those in PAM and ARTHUR,
yet it was not the inverse of those programs, as one might
expect. In fact, their implementations varied dramatically
[12,19]. But we now expect future natural language systems
to integrate plan-understanding and plan-synthesizing
abilities, not necessarily to the point where they are in
essence different interpreters of a common data base of
planning knowledge, but at least so that they can understand
what they themselves generate.
3.0 An example
Here again is our story:
John wanted to meet Mary, and he received an
invitation to a party given by Jane, John believed
that Jane and Mary were good friends, so he accepted
the invitation. An hour into the party, John had
still not seen Mary.
We will analyze the story from John's viewpoint. The
background information in John's belief space is that Mary
and Jane are friends and that he wants to meet Mary. The
initial event is that he receives an invitation from Jane
for a party. The system's knowledge of "party" and
"invitation" is sufficient for John to recognize that this
is a REQUEST, and that John must respond. How does he do
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this? If John hates parties, he will decline. If he is an
avid party-goer, he will accept. But suppose neither is the
case. Then he must decide. To do this, he needs to examine
the situation in more detail, which he does by imagining
(mentally simulating) Jane giving a party. He can do this
because he knows how one gives parties, and he generates
such a situation with Jane in the role of hostess. The
system knows that a party has, say, three principal
activities, eating, drinking, and socializing. He can now
react to each of those three. Again, there may be immediate
reactions: if he's on a strict diet, or he's always
interested in a free drink, he may decide right away. He
might also explore each of those by considering what food
Jane is likely to serve, etc., which again he would do by
simulating Jane's behavior "in his head,"
The decision whether to consider such details is part
of what we call shallow planning. The factors include the
planner's particular interests and habits, as well as his
known goals, past, present, and future. These are the
"top-down" considerations. But there are "bottom-up"
considerations that also serve to reduce the search. Both
of these kinds of considerations, or "planning filters," are
organized in REACTOR by the kind of indexed memorv that
ARTHUR used in understanding plans [3]. They can also
influence the order in which various aspects of a
hypothetical plan are considered.
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Suppose John has no strong reactions to the eating or
drinking parts of the party. In considering the social
aspect, he considers that Jane is likely to invite people
she likes. He notices that since he has received an
invitation, Jane probably likes him. He may react to that,
especially if it is a new or contradictory piece of
information. But he also notices that Jane will probably
invite Mary, since he thinks Jane likes Mary. If she
attends the party and he does too, th^n he will have
achieved one of the preconditions for his goal of meeting
her, namely, being in the same place. This is a very strong
positive reaction, so he decides to respond to Jane's
request by accepting the invitation. So far so good.
Now John is at the party and hasn't seen Mary, even
though the party has been going on for an hour. The plan
isn't working, and John notices that and attempts to explain
the failure. He notices it because a time limit has expired
for achieving the goal. This is one of several ways in
which plan-failures can be noticed; most others are more
direct, and correspond to the sources of plan failure,
described below.
Explaining plan failure may or may not be simple. Some
plans may already have attached to them a set of likely
causes for failure. We will see some examples shortly. But
assuming that John doesn't have a ready explanation for not
yet having seen Mary, he searches for a reason by
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synthesizing and examining what he believes Mary's plan is.
He begins by assuming that she had a plan that worked (i.e.,
would have brought her to the party), and he then questions
each part of that plan. In John's hypothesizing, Jane has
sent Mary an invitation; Mary has received the invitation;
she understands it (when the party was being held, etc.);
she decides to go to the party; she goes to the party; she
runs in to John. John knows that the "top" of this sequence
is true (Jane is giving a party), but the "bottom" isn't (he
hasn't run in to Mary). He examines the parts of this plan
in detail. (For this presentation, we will look at them in
bottom-up order.)
1. Problem: Mary is at the party, but I haven't run
in to her.
Explanation: She's in some other room.
Response: I can find her by wandering around.
Note: I've done that for the past hour, so that's
not the explanation.
2. Problem; She decided to go, but she isn't here.
Explanation 1: She isn't here yet. but she will
arrive later.
Response; There's nothing to do but wait some
more.
Explanation 2; Something is interfering with her
plan to get here.
Response: Examine her plan for getting here (e.g.,
D-PROX). [At this point, he synthesizes Mary's
plan for getting to the party. Given what little
he knows about her, he decides that she will use
her car.]
1. Problem: she decided to use her car, but it
didn't work.
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Explanations (immediate, since we have
knowledge about car problems already stored, so
we need not expand the USE-CAR plan): dead
battery, no gas, flat tire.
Response; she should find a gas station.
Note; finding a gas station is not likely to
be a problem, so there's no point in pursuing
this path.
[Since that was the only reasonable technique for
D-PROX, that path is ended.]
Problem: she understood the invitation, but she
decided not to go.
Explanation 1 (immediate); Mary is sick. This is
a pre-stored reason to turn down any invitation.
Response; none. It is very unlikely that being
sick was part of her plan.
Explanation 2; Mary hates parties; i.e., she
herself had an immediate, negative reaction to the
idea of aoing to a party.
Response: none (unaffectable state).
Note; if this is the most likely explanation
(after other possibilities have been considered),
figure out some other way of meeting her. Also,
Mary may be unsocial.
Explanation 3; the party interfered with something
else she wanted to do.
Response; without knowing what Mary's other plans
were, there's not much John can do here. If he
knew, then he could expand those plans, looking for
an explanation.
Explanation 4: Mary is avoiding some unpleasant
state associated with going to the party; i.e.,
she thought about the party and decided against it.
Response: John expands the plan for going to the
party, D-PROX + $PARTY, looking for potential
negative states.
D-PROX; again, John decides that Mary would use
her car.
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1. Problem: she wants to go to the party, but she
doesn't want to use her car«
Explanation 1: Mary doesn't like driving long
distances [assuming that John thinks that it's
along way from Mary's house to the party].
Response; none.
Note; Next time, try to arrange a meeting
closer to Mary.
Explanation 2: she doesn't want to spend the
money on gas.
Response; none.
Note; Mary may be a tightwad.
John now looks the negative aspects of $PARTY. He
expands that into its three components, EAT, DRINK
and SOCIALIZE.
1. Problem; Mary wants to go the party, but she
wants to avoid eating.
Explanation; She's on a diet.
Response; none.
2. Problem; she want to avoid drinking.
Explanation 1; she doesn't drink at all.
Response; none.
Note; She may not be much fun after all.
Explanation 2; she's a recovering alcoholic.
Response; none.
Note; John consults his attitudes towards
alcoholics.
3. Problem; she doesn't want to talk to the
people at the party.
Response; expand that into two categories,
John and all the others.
1. Problem; she doesn't want to talk to me.
Explanation; she doesn't think I'm
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attractive, interesting, etCc, etc.
Responses I will have to persuade her
otherwise. [This could lead to several
minutes* worth of exploration.]
Problem: she doesn't want to talk to
someone else at the party.
Explanations Since John knows very little
about Mary's attitudes towards the other
people at the party, there's not much he
can do here.
[End of SOCIALIZE path]
[End of D-PROX + $PARTY path]
4. Problem: Mary got the invitation, but she didn't
understand the details.
Explanation: She got the time or the date wrong.
Response: Call her up and tell her.
Note: Don't do that — it would be socially risky.
5. Problem: She didn't get the invitation.
Explanation: The Post Office is slow.
Response: none.
Note: this plan may work at some later date.
6. Problem: Jane didn't invite Mary at all.
Explanation 1: Doing so would have interfered with
some plan of Jane's.
Response: Expand Jane's plans for the party.
Etc.
Page 13
4.0 Categories of feedback knowledge
What information will need to be included in the system
that reasons in this fashion? Obviously, it will need to
know both how to generate and how to understand plans, and
many existing systems will be useful here.
Wilensky has recently suggested [18] that planning
knowledge is one, unified body of information, accessible
either through plan-making or plan-understanding. Our own
belief is that top-down (planning) information is much more
detailed than bottom-up (plan-understanding) information,
and our proposed system achieves the same effect by
alternating freely between the two. This is, of course, an
open question that we do not attempt to resolve here, but we
think it is nonetheless important to develop and test such a
mechanism.
In particular, there are two components of a feedback
simulator that do not arise in separate understanding or
synthesis systems; (1) explaining plan failure, and (2)
responding accordingly. The following is a partial list of
sources of plan failures and possible responses to them.
1. Reason: BAD TIMING. The desired state (goal) is
not true at this time; i.e., it may be too early,
or it may be too late.
Response; In the case of something that has not
yet happened might be to wait for it to happen or
to cause the state to become true sooner. If it's
already too late, it may be possible to use the
same plan to achieve the same goal, starting over
with all the preconditions, etc.
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2. Reason; ACCIDENTAL MOTOR SKILL FAILURE, such as
missing a golf shot. Deliberate errors of this
type are categorized under interference (see
below). j
i
Response; this depends on how likely it was that
the plan could have been executed successfully.
{One hesitates to call a football jgame a
2-hour-long accident simply because of motor skill
failures.)
I
3. Reason; ACCIDENTAL SYSTEM FAILURE, such as delayed
delivery of mail or a disabled vehicle.
Response; this is system-specific and may! involve
system repair if the plan is to be pursued, or
excuses about forces beyond our control otherwise.
Physical illness is included here. j
4. Reason: BELIEF-SPACE INCONSISTENCY. In our sample
story, John thought Jane and Mary were friends, but
that may have been incorrect and would account for
the failure of his plan.
1
Response; attempt to reconcile the inconsistency,
if possible.
5. Reason; FAULTY CAUSALITY. The planner didn't
understand how something "works," such as the rules
in a game, so that the situation he expiected to
occur actually had no basis in reality. i
Response; theplanning rules can be revised, but
there is probably little that can be salvjaged from
the original plan. j
6. Reason; TOO-SHALLOW PLANNING. The planner missed
some detail that crucially affected the outcome of
the plan. This can result from faulty "indices" or
plan filters. j
Response: incorporate the missed detail into
future indices. |
7. Reason; NEGLECTED PRECONDITION. A precondition
was not considered during the formatilon of the
plan.
Response; if the precondition can now be
the plan may yet be salvaged.
achieved.
Reason; FAILED PRECONDITION. A precondition that
was asuumed not to be a problem has failed.
Response; examine the details of the plan for
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achieving the precondition and "recursively" to
apply the diagnosis procedure to thato
9. Reason: DELIBERATE INTERFERENCE, when another
actor has sabotaged the plan.
Response; simulate that person's planning to
attempt to establish the reason for the
interference.
10. NON-COMPLIANCE, when a participant in the plan
doesn't behave as expected.
Response: figure out why that person did not
comply. The plan in question may have conflicted
with that person's goals, there may be a
misunderstanding that can be corrected, or there
may have been a lengthy evaluation of the pros and
cons (which the planner may then try to simulate).
11. Finally, there is always BAD LUCK, specially when
the plan involves chance (e.g., dice) or
unpredictability (e.g., the weather).
Response: try, try again?
5.0 Understanding and planning
5.1 Understanding as a technique for planning
Planning in a world in which there is any sort of
causality requires being able to compute the consequences of
an action, equivalent to a simulation of that action. In
robot planning, all the consequences are known with
certainty, and the only way to introduce errors into this
process is by neglecting to make some inferences, which
might be a reasonable byproduct of a system trying to avoid
inferential explosion. In any case, consequences must be
"understood" — that is, they must be linked to other states
and acts that the system knows about. If the causal model
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is complete and error-free, then "perfect" planning is
possible, meaning that there will be no surprises in store,
although there may still be difficult problems determining
the proper sequence of actions so that subgoals do not
annihilate each other.
In a simulation of human actors, all bets are off.
While some inferences that the actors will make can always
be trusted ("context-free" inferences), others depend on
what the actor knows. Instead of a formal causality, we
must represent belief spaces; what John thinks, what Mary
thinks, what John thinks Mary thinks, etc., in varying
degrees of depth and accuracy. These belief spaces contain
goals, among other things. When John performs some act,
such as asking a favor of Mary, she must "understand" that
in terms of her beliefs about John's goals, which may not at
all correspond to John's actual beliefs, before she can plan
what to do next.
The point is that in order to simulate planning, we
must also simulate understanding, using some of the same
techniques that PAM and ARTHUR, for example, used to link
States to plans and plans to goals. In this view, their
programs are characters, Pam and Arthur, who are responding
to input, albeit somewhat passively. We must have some
representation for separate and shared belief spaces, well
integrated into the understander.
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5.2 Planning as a technique for understanding
PAM and ARTHUR can generate "top-down inferences" from
goals to plans to actions, but otherwise their capacity as
problem solvers is limited. When they have established that
a goal is under pursuit, they make only very simple
predictions about what will happen next, rather than to take
in account large amounts of existing information and apply
problem-solving strategies. ARTHUR can later revise its
prediction by seeking another way of explaining why
something actually does make sense in terms of the
previously established goal. But for all its cleverness, it
sometimes resembles a rather inattentive listener: rather
than try hard to anticipate what's coming up, it is content
to follow along, barely, and have everything explained to
it. In short, the predictive components of these programs
are weak because they lack planning skills,
5,3 Feedback simulation and shallow planning
To incorporate both planning and understanding
components, our simulator has the following structure.
Picking an arbitrary point in the cycle, suppose John has
already chosen a goal to pursue, A number of plans may
present themselves, (Of course, this set may not be the
same for Mary, or for John at some other time, and the order
may vary.) Some of these plans may have preconditions that
John remembers, and he will take those into consideration.
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He may now decide to work on them firsts in "means-ends"
style, but that is only one possible way to deal with them
(and the only way TALE-SPIN dealt with them), More likely,
the preconditions have contraints of time and other
resources that may merge with other planned events. If he
does choose the means-ends approach, it is because the
planning heuristics indicated that that was reasonable in
the current context.
We certainly want to leave the option that there will
be preconditions that Joes does not remember now.
Otherwise, we fall prey to the Fallacy of the Perfect
Planner, where humans resemble the robot planners. In real
life, we don't have the time to anticipate everything in
advance, much less the ability, and we sometimes must act
quickly, at the risk of making an error. This is especially
true in speech [10], where we can easily get ourselves into
the kind of bind that we would not if we were writing.
Moreover, there are other ways to become aware of
preconditions than having them hard-wired to plans, using
hypothetical simulation. For example, if I want to see a
film, I can simulate the theater-script by imagining that
I'm there. In the first scene of that script, I'm handing
some money to the ticket seller. (I "see" this, or
"construct" it, or "remember" it, or follow a MOP for it, or
whatever.) That is a legitimate way of becoming aware of
the "have money" precondition. It may happen at planning
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time, or halfway to the theater, or not until I'm actually
there. The point is that we wnat to allow flexibility in
our model.
Carried to an extreme, this approach would allow us
drastically to reduce the backwards inferences we need to
make. We would consider only the very local or immediate
requirements; as an example, if I'm handing money to
someone now, them I have to have money now. Hard-wired
long-range preconditions do exist, but they are learned.
Human behavior is a mix of the efficient and inefficient.
Suppose now that John has chosen a particular plan, and
all the preconditions that he has considered are met (in his
belief space, anyway). Some act is called for, and John
imagines performing that act — simulating it in the context
of his beliefs. A number of consequences occur, some of
which he may have anticipated, others of which he may not.
In either case, these consequences are feedback for him, to
be reconciled with his goal structure. In the trivial case,
the consequences exactly match his goals — he imagines that
the plan works perfectly. AI models with strongly connected
causality have this characteristic — since nothing can go
wrong (can go wrong, can go wrong, ...), there's no point to
this step. A faulty causality is therefore one source of
plan failure, as mentioned in the previous section.
Page 20
The consequences that were not explicitly intended must
now be "understood," and much of the PAM/ARTHUR machinery is
quite useful here. For those events that can be connected
to goals, John can determine whether the goals conflict with
the initial goal, and so on, and he can employ various
strategies ("meta-plans" [17,18]) to deal with this. Other
consequences may be the product of natural forces or other
powers beyond John's control, not amenable to negotiation or
discussion, so alternative plans may be sought. The only
cost here is the time is takes to think all this through,
since John is still imagining all this.
Suppose the consequences are satisfactory, and John
decides actually to perform the act, and does so. Now the
real simulator produces the actual consequences, and they,
too, become feedback for John. If they match his
predictions, then he can continue with his plan. But they
may not. Something may have gone wrong, and the error must
be accounted for and dealt with. It may be that the planner
has already formulated a plan for coping with the failure.
Contingency planning, in fact, is exactly this; the planner
explicitly prepares for certain errors in advance. Related
to contingency planning is game-tree planning, where the
planner hypothesizes several outcomes that are simply
possibilities, not errors. A chess player may be prepared
to respond to some specific moves by his opponent, and he
may also have a contingency plan to deal with unexpected
moves (knock over the board) . Contingency plans are thus in
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service of higher-level goals,
6.0 Other related work
Plan-based understanding programs assume that the
actors in the stories are goal—directed. What the programs
are doing, then, is monitoring the execution of the actors'
plans. It would seem natural to wonder whether this work
shares the approach taken by so-called robot planners, or
automatic plan-synthesizers [13], and if not, whether they
should [9]. The answer is no and yes.
No, because the nature of events in stories differs
from that of the automatic planner. In the world of
automatic planning, there is usually only one actor, the
planner, who has complete knowledge about the world and is
faced with the task of figuring out how to achieve some
goal, getting it right the first time. Typically, this
involves looking at subgoals, their preconditions, and their
side-effects. Finding the proper sequence of events, so
that achieving one goal doesn't annihilate another, for
\
instance, is a concern of many of these systems. Even those
few systems that handle errors "after the fact," like
Sussman's HACKER [16], still live in a world of one actor,
where time can be reversed by backtracking or undoing. All
of these programs struggle to "do it right" the first time,
and become very unhappy otherwise.
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In contrast, a world of several human actors lacks
complete information. Time cannot be reversed, and each
actor's belief space may differ in some respects from every
other actor's. In fact, one character's belief space will
have to contain models of the other actors' belief spaces,
which may or may not be consistent with those actors' own
belief spaces.
But yes, plan-understanding programs should have the
ability to monitor the execution of plans, so that they can
diagnose errors and respond appropriately, perhaps taking
remedial action.
7.0 Summary
We have examined some of the intricacies of planning in
a world of many actors and incomplete informatibn. We have
attempted to point out that the two processes of bottom-up
plan inference and top-down plan synthesis are inseparable,
whether solving a problem or understanding the progress of
someone else who is solving a problem. These processes
require the use of separate belief spaces (e.g., what John
thinks Mary thinks about John). Failures in plan execution
are categorized as to source, and as feedback to the
planner, they may invoke various responses and suggest
future goals to be pursued. We are currently incorporating
these ideas in REACTOR, a natural-language understanding
system.
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